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Lean Transformation in the U.S. Aerospace Industry: 
 
Appreciating Interdependent Social and Technical Systems 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Lean practices and principles build on a half-century of successive initiatives aimed at 
transforming social and technical systems in organizations.  While they are seen as central to the 
revitalization of the U.S. aerospace industry, there is great variation in the degree to which lean 
initiatives emphasize just technical/manufacturing systems versus additional social and 
enterprise dimensions.  Based on a national random sample survey of 362 U.S. aerospace 
facilities, this paper examines factors that account for the incidence of lean practices and the 
impact on outcomes relevant to key stakeholders.  While structural factors such as industry 
sector, facility size and others have limited explanatory power, two process factors – 
organizational learning and the value placed on intellectual capital – do account for the increased 
presence of lean practices.  In examining employment outcomes, facilities higher just on the 
technical/manufacturing aspects of lean have a significant and negative impact on job growth, 
while facilities higher around the social systems associated with lean have significant and 
positive employment growth.  This finding is consistent with the views of critics of the more 
narrow technical, manufacturing-oriented approaches to lean as a threat to employment and it 
validate proponents of a broader value-creating approach to lean as a way of growing the 
enterprise.  Enterprise dimensions of lean (including both social and technical aspects of lean) 
have a positive impact on productivity.  Examining outcomes relevant to multiple stakeholders 
and various factor inputs produces a more complete understanding of the limitations and 
potential for lean transformation in the aerospace industry.   
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 3
Introduction 
 Throughout the past half century there has been a succession of major systems change 
initiatives designed to transform work and organizations.  These include the human relations 
movement of the 1950s, the socio-technical systems design experiments of the 1960s and 1970s, 
the quality of work life and total quality management initiatives of the 1980s, and a current array 
of initiatives involving organizational learning, lean manufacturing and lean enterprise 
transformation, Six Sigma, and others.  All of these initiatives have emerged in one way or 
another in response to the combination of mass production, the division of labor in organizations, 
and the bureaucratic organizational form – which marked the first half of the past century and 
were linked to initiatives such as scientific management and the civil service reform movement.1  
All of the more recent initiatives emphasize (in varying degrees) participation, teamwork, 
problem solving, learning, continuous improvement, flow of material and services, delivery of 
value, and a systems mindset.  An enduring challenge associated with all of these initiatives 
involves understanding the interdependence of the social and technical systems in organizations 
– as elements of the change initiatives and dimensions on which the outcomes can be assessed.  
The broad purpose of this paper is to focus on one of the more comprehensive current initiatives 
– those building on lean practices and principles – in the context of a particularly relevant 
industry – aerospace – in order to build deeper understanding around this social and technical 
interdependence. 
 Lean practices and principles are central to the success of competitive leaders in many 
sectors of the economy, whether it is the way Toyota manages quality and production flow in its 
                                                 
1 While we are today critical of these as segmented, mechanistic initiatives, they were embraced 
at the time as advantageous relative to craft and patronage based work/organizational systems. 
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manufacturing operations or the way Dell provides high volume customization in personal 
computers.  In the U.S. aerospace industry, many facilities are involved in the implementation of 
these practices and principles, though few have completed the transformation into fully lean 
operations.  Moreover, this industry, notorious for what are considered wasteful practices in both 
military and commercial sectors, is now under pressure to deliver better products in faster and 
less expensive ways.  Aerospace is also one of the world’s prestige industries, representing an 
importance source of export dollars for the US and EEU, as well as a leading symbol of 
technological progress for many nations.  As such, aerospace provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the factors driving lean transformation, as well as the implications for outcomes 
relevant to key stakeholders. 
 
Background 
 The term “lean” was initially popularized by the book The Machine the Changed the 
World (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990).  This word crystallized a broad range of practices and 
principles where continuous improvement was made possible through the systematic elimination 
of waste, the reduction of in-process inventory, the use of just-in-time delivery, in-station process 
control, continuous improvement suggestions, systems thinking, and other related elements 
(Krafcik, 1989; Womack and Jones, 1996).  Lean practices and principles encompass long-
standing quality principles (Deming, 1987; Juran, 1999) and more recent developments, such as 
Six Sigma (Ekes, 2001).   
 Although the Japanese operations from which the term was initially fashioned always 
gave prominence to the social or intangible aspects of lean systems (Imai, 1986; Shimada and 
MacDuffie, 1986; Monden, 1988; Ohno, 1998; Kenny and Florida, 1995; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 
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et. al., 1998), many applications of lean practices and principles have focused more narrowly on 
the technical or physical aspects of lean systems (such as inventory delivery systems and 
“andon” quality control lights and information boards).   Indeed, the term “lean” has become so 
associated with narrowly focused cost cutting initiatives – emphasizing layoffs and outsourcing – 
that it sometimes generates fear in the workforce and in communities where lean initiatives are 
announced.  The central thesis driving this paper is that the social and technical aspects of lean 
implementation are interdependent.  Taken together, there is the potential for the sort of systemic 
transformation originally intended; advanced separately, there is the risk of unstable or 
incomplete outcomes.  
 The aerospace industry provides a useful context to examine lean implementation.  It is a 
diverse sector of the economy that encompasses airframes, engines, space and missiles, avionics 
and a vast array of second and third tier suppliers.  There are great competitive challenges in both 
the civilian and military parts of the industry, driven by the end of the Cold War, the rise of 
global competition, the development of new materials and new technologies, and the emergence 
of what are termed “dominant designs” in many segments of the market (Utterback, 1996).  In 
this mix, lean practices and principles have been highlighted as central to the revitalization of the 
industry.  For example, Norman Augustine, retired Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin, 
called for the application of principles from The Machine that Changed the World (1990) to this 
industry, commenting that, “The U.S. aerospace industry has restructured what it is, now it must 
restructure what it does and how it does it” (Murman, et. al., 2002).  Indeed, in the industry there 
is still great variation in practice and an ongoing debate among practitioners as to the full 
applicability of lean principles derived from high-volume automotive production systems.   
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 Moreover, there is also significant debate around the relative impacts of the social and 
technical dimensions of “lean.”  Employees and their union representatives have been critical of 
narrowly focused technical lean manufacturing initiatives that have sought to eliminate waste 
and improve operations largely through reductions in in-process inventory, improvements in 
material flow, increased preventative maintenance and other means.  Such efforts have been 
criticized as biased toward cost cutting that reduces “head-count,” rather than increasing value or 
growing the operations.  This is particularly troubling given the massive job loss in this sector – 
from over 1.3 million jobs in 1990 to under 800,000 jobs in 2002 (Buffenbarger, 2002).  
Conversely, a recent book produced by MIT’s Lean Aerospace Initiative – entitled Lean 
Enterprise Value – presents propositions emphasizing the integration of social and technical 
dimensions of lean, as well as the importance of people in effectuating lean value (Murman, et. 
al., 2002). The analysis in this paper speaks directly to one of the five core principles in the book, 
which states that “people, not just processes, effectuate lean value.” 
 At a more general level, there is a long history of emphasizing the social and technical 
dimensions of complex systems (Trist, 1978; Pava, 1983), though comparatively little systematic 
research examining such issues at an industry or other higher level of aggregation.  This research 
represents an important opportunity to build beyond the body of case study scholarship built by 
socio-technical researchers in an earlier era and an important contribution to current explorations 
of complex engineering systems (MIT Engineering Systems Division, 2002).   
 
Overall Research Questions and Model  
 This paper examines the factors that explain the incidence of lean practices and 
principles, as well the consequences for social and economic performance outcomes.   The 
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overall model guiding the analysis is presented in Figure 1, which provides a conceptual map of 
all the key variables utilized in the analysis.   
Figure 1 
Model for Analysis of the Causes and Consequences  
of Social and Technical Systems Associated with Lean Transformation  
 
Structural Factors       Social Outcomes 
 
Industry Sector 
 
   Lean Processes 
 
  Employment  
Sub-Contractor  
Status  
   Lean Production – 
Technical Systems 
  Worker Satisfaction 
Product Volume  Addl. Processes  Lean Social 
Systems 
   
Facility Age  
(in years)        
 Organizational 
Learning Culture 
 Lean Enterprise 
Systems   
  Economic Outcomes 
Employment  
(log) 
 Intellectual 
Capital Valued 
    Productivity 
Performance 
Per-Capita Investment 
in New Technology 
      Quality  
Performance 
Union Status       Profitability 
Performance 
 
 The purpose of presenting the full model here is to provide an orientation to the overall 
focus of the research.  The specific ways in which these variables are operationalized is 
presented in more detail later in the paper.  The first part of the paper concerns what can be 
termed the causal factors associated with the prevalence of the technical aspects of lean 
production systems, the social systems associated with lean principles and practices, and other 
overall enterprise aspects of lean.  For this analysis, the three types of lean processes serve as the 
dependent variables.  The structural factors are utilized to predict these various lean outcomes.  
Two additional process factors are also used in the analysis to help predict the incidence of the 
three dimensions of lean.  These are process factors that could be the entire focus of research in 
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their own right (which is being conducted in parallel with the analysis presented here), but they 
are examined in this research as potential complementary aspects to lean transformation.   
 The second part of the analysis concerns the impact of all the structural and process 
factors on various outcomes.  Both social and economic performance outcomes are considered, 
reflecting what might be considered a balanced scorecard approach to organizational 
performance (Kaplan, 1996).   
 
A National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 The data for this paper are derived from two national, random-sample surveys of 
aerospace facilities in the United States.  The first survey was conducted in 1999 and features 
responses from 194 facilities.  The second survey, which is the basis for most of the research 
presented in this paper, was conducted in 2002 and features responses from 362 facilities.  In 
both cases, the samples were drawn from McGraw-Hill’s National Aerospace Directory, which 
involved mailings to approximately 2,500 facilities each time.  In both surveys, approximately 
300 surveys were returned as having bad addresses or (in a smaller number of cases) as 
companies that were no longer in the aerospace industry.  Subsequent telephone follow-up with 
approximately 900 of the first sample and 400 of the second sample revealed a large number of 
surveys that never completed the journey from the mail room to the office of the senior manager, 
as well as a smaller number of respondents who only had a small proportion of business in the 
aerospace industry.  While it is difficult to estimate the full weighting to give to the various 
reasons for non-response, the first survey can be conservatively assumed to have between a 10% 
and 15% response rate, while the second can be conservatively assumed to have between an 18% 
and 23% response rate. 
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 The facilities in the sample have an average size of 558 employees, though the range is 
from very small operations with less than ten employees to some very large operations which are 
really complexes that have over 20,000 employees.  The average facility in this sample was built 
in 1976, with a range that is quite broad, including some brand new operations and some that 
date back before World War II.  On average, the facilities in this sample have about 30 percent of 
their sales to their largest customer, with an average of 5.4 major government programs and 8.9 
major commercial programs at each facility.  Approximately 15 percent of the facilities are 
unionized in this sample.  Also, the distribution of production operations in these facilities 
reflects the low volume nature of this industry, with 60 percent of the facilities reporting that 
their primary product involves low volume production, 32 percent reporting medium volume and 
only 8 percent reporting high volume for their primary product.  The distribution across major 
sectors of this industry is as follows: 
 
Aircraft Frames/Structures: 24% 
Aircraft Engines:   13% 
Avionics:    15% 
Spacecraft and Missiles:  6% 
Other (mostly suppliers):  42% 
 
This distribution is roughly consistent with the distribution of operations in the industry.2 
 The advantages of these data sets is that they may be the first national random sample 
surveys of work practices, lean principles, organizational outcomes and related factors for the 
aerospace industry.   As well, the respondents are highly knowledgeable, with an average of 24 
years experience in aerospace.  Nearly 40 percent of the respondents hold the titles “president” or 
                                                 
2 Precise industry distributions are hard to estimate since firms span multiple sectors through 
acquisitions and shifts in business strategy.  Many firms also span aerospace and other industries.      
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“CEO,” approximately another 40 percent of the respondents hold the titles of “vice president of 
operations” or “plant/facility/operations manager,” and the balance of respondents hold other 
senior functional titles.  On average, the respondents have undergraduate degrees and some 
graduate education.  
 Still, there are limitations to the data.  First, these are two cross-sectional surveys.  While 
there is a panel of firms who responded to both surveys, the analysis presented here does not 
focus on this panel (in order to maintain sufficient degrees of freedom for the multivariate 
analysis).  Second, these are responses from single respondents at the facility level.  This means 
that the data will reflect a predominantly managerial bias and that interdependencies across 
facilities (such as customer-supplier relations or cross-divisional relations within a larger 
company) will only be seen from one perspective.  Third, there are always threats of common 
method bias with any research based on a single survey.  Although the presence of two rounds of 
surveys with consistent findings on factors that would not be expected to change does help to 
reduce these concerns, the data within each survey does have this threat to validity.  Fourth, key 
outcome variables are measured as single items.  While these outcomes can be combined 
together into highly reliable scales, some important distinctive information is lost in the process 
– so the single items are used.  Fifth, the first survey was conducted during a period in which 
industry sales were growing, but facing declining investment by Wall Street.  The second survey 
was conducted after the events of September 11, 2001, during a period of recession in the 
commercial sector and some expansion in the military sector.   The reader is urged to bear in 
mind these factors when interpreting the findings from this research. 
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Social, Technical and Enterprise Dimensions of Lean Implementation 
 At a superficial level, lean is one of many change initiatives found in the aerospace 
industry and in many other sectors of the economy.  As Table 1 suggests, the most common 
change initiatives in this industry are employee involvement (EI) and total quality management 
(TQM), both initiatives that are no longer in the public spotlight but still prevalent in just over 
half of the facilities.   Of all the initiatives, only two show substantial growth from 1999 to 2002, 
which are lean production and kaizen improvement initiatives (a targeted application of certain 
lean principles).3 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Organizational Change Initiatives in the U.S. Aerospace Industry:  1999 and 2002 
 
 While the relative distribution of initiatives is instructive, it is hard to know what 
respondents have in mind when they indicate the presence of lean initiatives.  As a result, a more 
detailed set of questions was posed on specific aspects of lean systems.  Of these questions, four 
involved what can be thought of as traditional technical aspects of lean, focused on 
manufacturing operations.  These have been combined into a “Lean Manufacturing – Technical 
Systems Scale,” which is as follows: 
                                                 
3 Note that the Japanese concept of kaizen is commonly understood based on its literal 
translation, which involves continuous improvement based on knowledge (Imai, 1986; Cutcher-
Gershenfeld, et. al., 1998).  This suggests an incremental approach to change.  In fact, the term as 
been used very differently in the aerospace industry, where people refer to “kaizen events” 
comparable to more discrete re-engineering initiatives, which are almost the opposite of a 
traditional kaizen approach.  In either case, however, there is a focus on key lean principles of 
waste reduction in order to enable increased flow of material and information. 
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Lean Manufacturing – Technical Systems Scale (scale reliability alpha = .60) with four 
questions concerning: 
¾ Minimal  “in-process” inventory 
¾ Reducing cycle times 
¾ Preventative maintenance 
¾ In-process inspection 
 
A second set of six items involve the social and more intangible aspects of lean, which have been 
combined into the following “Lean Social Systems Scale:”   
Lean Social Systems Scale (scale reliability alpha = .80) with six questions concerning: 
¾ Flexible job assignments 
¾ Job rotation 
¾ High levels of worker responsibility on the job 
¾ Extensive formal group process training 
¾ Emphasis on the continuous improvement 
¾ High trust between management and employees  
 
These ten items have been combined with five additional items spanning across the enterprise 
(beyond manufacturing to include product development and the supply chain) to form the “Lean 
Enterprise Scale,” which is as follows: 
The full Lean Enterprise Scale (scale reliability alpha = .88) with the above ten items 
and these five additional factors:  
¾ Simultaneous/concurrent engineering  
¾ Engineering organized by integrated product or process teams (IPTs)  
¾ Scheduling on a “pull” basis driven by customer orders 
¾ “Flow” of material or design ideas -- no wasted steps 
¾ Tightly integrated suppliers 
 
Note that the use of the term “enterprise” reflects an expanded view of lean, which can 
encompass a particular program, such as the network of suppliers and prime contractors 
associated with the F-22, or a multi-program enterprise, such as the Lockheed Martin 
Corporation (Murman, et. al., 2002).  While other levels of “enterprise” are possible, the point 
here is that these are practices that reach beyond a given facility and link to a supply chain or a 
product value stream. 
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 These three scales will serve as the dependent variables in the first analysis and as 
independent variables (along with the structural and other process variables) in the second 
analysis.  In each case, it is a six point scale for which a “1” represents “not found at all in this 
facility,” a “3” and “4” represents “partly true of this facility,” and a “6” represents “completely 
true of this facility.”  Respondents were also offered the chance to indicate any item as “not 
applicable.”  
 
Bivariate Analysis of Factors Predicting Lean Practices 
 In trying to predict the incidence of social, technical and enterprise lean practices in the 
aerospace industry, we will first compare the means for the three lean scales with a number of 
structural variables.  This will help to introduce how these variables have been constructed and 
examine first-order or primary effects. Where there are hypotheses around expected relationships 
among the variables it will be indicated in the text.  Then we will turn to multivariate analysis 
taking all of the variables into account at the same time. 
 The bivariate analysis of means begins with the major sectors of the industry.  Since the 
lean concepts were first codified in the auto industry, which features high volume production, 
and since lean practices are also found the computer electronics business, we would anticipate 
the utilization of lean principles to be in high use in the avionics sector.  This involves computer 
electronics and it is the highest volume portion of the industry.  In fact, there is little difference 
across sectors of the economy when it comes to lean practices.  For example, the average 
response on the six-point lean enterprise scale for the airframes and mechanical systems sector 
was 3.9; aircraft engines and propulsion was 4.0; space, launch and missiles was 3.9 and avionics 
was 3.8.  The differences among these responses are not statistically significant, suggesting that 
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the prevalence of lean practices across different sectors of the industry does not vary 
considerably by sector and, on average, the utilization of the practices is only partial.  There were 
also no significant differences across sectors for the Lean Manufacturing/Technical Scale and for 
the Lean Social Systems Scale (though the average response on the Lean 
Manufacturing/Technical Scale was slightly higher, at 4.1, for all sectors).  Similarly, there were 
no significant differences on any of the three lean scales comparing sub-contractors with what 
are known as the prime or original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). 
 Just as we would have expected there to be differences between avionics and other 
sectors, we would also expect lean practices to be more prevalent in high volume operations.  In 
fact, the mean for the Lean Enterprise Scale in both high and medium volume operations is 3.9, 
while it is 3.8 for low volume operations – a difference that is not statistically significant.  There 
are also no significant differences for the Lean Manufacturing/Technical Scale and for the Lean 
Social Systems Scale.  
 It is hard to make predications for how facility size would be expected to influence the 
incidence of lean practices and principles.  On the one hand, implementation is much easier in a 
smaller facility.  On the other hand, there are generally more resources available for 
implementation and an increased potential for corporate initiatives around lean in a larger 
facility.  In fact, the means in Table 2 suggest that there are some differences based on size, with 
the differences among the means on the Lean Enterprise Scale being statistically significant.  
While the patterns are less clear in comparisons based on facility age for the Lean Enterprise 
Scale and the Lean Manufacturing/Technical Scale, there is a clear and statistically significant 
trend for facility age and the Lean Social Systems Scale – with the newer facilities more likely to 
feature more of the social system practices.  Note that the upcoming multivariate analysis uses 
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the log of employment for facility size since the very largest facilities represent substantial 
outliers with respect to the bulk of facilities which have under 250 employees.  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Means for Lean Practices – Technical, Social and Enterprise – by Facility Size and Age 
2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 
  Lean Enterprise 
Scale 
Lean Production -- 
Technical Systems 
Lean Social 
Systems 
Under 250 employees 3.8 4.1 3.9 
250-1,000 employees 4.1 4.1 3.9 
Over 1,000 employees 4.0 4.3 3.8 
Facility 
Size 
    
Earliest to 1959 3.7 4.1 3.7 
1960-1969 3.9 4.0 3.8 
1970-1979 3.7 4.0 3.9 
1980-1989 4.0 4.3 4.2 
Facility 
Age 
1990-present 3.9 4.1 4.0 
 
 Investment in new technology is an important control factor since performance outcomes 
could be a result of these investments rather than lean production systems.  Respondents were 
asked to rate new investments over the prior three years across five categories, which were 
“none,” “Under $500K,” “$500K-$5 Million,” “$5 Million-$25 Million,” and “Over $25 
Million.”  For this analysis, an estimate of per-capita investment was calculated with facility 
employment and the mid-point of each of the designated ranges.4  It might be predicted that per-
capita investment would correlate with lean practices, since new investment might be expected to 
be made in the most advanced facilities.  In fact, the comparison of means is significant in the 
opposite direction for all three variables.  For example, the Lean Enterprise Scale mean for per-
capita investment of zero to fifty dollars is 3.9, while it is 3.7 for fifty to one-hundred dollars, 
and 3.2 for investments of over one-hundred dollars.  A possible interpretation of this unexpected 
                                                 
4 A value of $35 Million used at the high end since there is no midpoint – this represents an 
equivalent increment above the prior two values. 
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finding would be that substantial capital investments are being made in factors other than lean 
systems and that these investments may even undercut the utilization of lean practices.  For 
example, there is some anecdotal evidence that investments in Material Resource Planning 
(MRP) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems may represent an alternative claim for 
such investment dollars.5  These findings are also consistent with research in U.S. manufacturing 
that documents increased per-capital investment by small firms relative to large firms, with more 
large firms allocating capital instead to dividends for shareholders (Weller, 2003). 
 It is not clear what to expect for unionized operations.  On the one hand, there is 
substantial research suggesting that, on average, unionized facilities are more productive than 
non-union facilities (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  On the other hand, unionized operations have 
a reputation for having more restrictive work rules that can serve as a barrier to lean 
implementation.  In fact, we see that the Lean Enterprise Scale for unionized operations is 
slightly higher (at 4.0) than for non-union operations (at 3.8), but this difference is not 
statistically significant.  Similarly, there is an opposite relationship for the Lean Social Systems 
Scale (3.8 for unionized operations versus 3.9 for non-union operations) that is also not 
                                                 
5 A recent conference of MIT’s Lean Aerospace Initiative featured a debate around whether 
Material Resource Planning (MRP) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) initiatives are 
complements with lean initiatives or competing for scarce resources, with clear concerns 
surfacing about each making competing claims for scarce resources – despite many 
complementary aspects of the two.  Also, among the respondents to this survey, approximately 
29 percent reported both lean and MRP initiatives, with 36 percent reporting one or the other and 
35 percent reporting both – which at least suggests that this could be a candidate initiative that 
would compete for per-capita investment dollars. 
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statistically significant.  There are no differences between union and non-union operations for the 
Lean Manufacturing/Technical Scale (4.1 for both). 
 Two additional process scales have been included in this analysis (separate from the three 
lean scales).  The first, is a scale comprised of six questions on the organizational learning 
culture or climate.  This scale is based on a set of questions developed by Tannenbaum (1994) 
and cover the following matters: 
¾ Employees have the opportunity to learn new skills 
¾ Employees are encouraged to try different approaches to solve problems 
¾ Employees are rewarded for using on the job what they have learned in training 
¾ Supervisors and co-workers help reschedule work so employees can attend 
training 
¾ Employees are open to new ideas and suggestions 
¾ Training is encouraged to develop the skills needed for advancement 
 
A second scale concerns the value given to various aspects of intellectual capital, including: 
¾ Patents 
¾ Copyrights 
¾ Proprietary processes 
¾ Technological leadership 
¾ Unique expertise/skills in the workforce 
¾ Investments in Research & Development 
¾ Investments in training 
¾ Investments in organization development 
¾ Knowledge generated by collaborative work 
¾ Front line knowledge about products and services 
¾ Capability of suppliers 
¾ Relationships with suppliers 
¾ Knowledge created with strategic partners 
 
 Both scales are highly reliable (alpha of .86 and .85 respectively) and they each represent 
aspects of an organization’s climate that can be expected to be enablers for the implementation 
of lean principles and practices.  In fact, there is a positive and significant relationship between 
each of these scales and the three dimensions of lean.  For example the mean response on the 
Lean Enterprise Scale for respondents disagreeing with the Learning Culture Statements is a 2.7, 
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compared with 3.6 for those neither agreeing nor disagreeing, and a 4.4 for those agreeing with 
these questions.  The relationship is similar for the Intellectual Capital Scale, with a mean 
response on the Lean Enterprise Scale of 3.1 among those indicating that the above items are 
“not important” or “somewhat important,” compared to a 3.8 for those rating these items as 
“important,” and a 4.4 for those rating them as “very important” or “extremely important.”  
These findings suggest that these two process factors are indeed highly interdependent with lean 
principles and practices. 
 
Multivariate Analysis of Factors Predicting Lean Practices 
 Three dimensions of “lean” have been highlighted for analysis in this paper – the 
technical dimensions of lean production systems, the social dimensions of lean and a combined 
scale with the social, technical and additional enterprise dimensions of lean.  Table 3 presents 
multivariate analysis of the factors influencing the degree to which facilities would be high on 
each of these dimensions.  In each case, two models are presented – one including just structural 
variables and one also including the process scales on intellectual capital and the process scale 
on learning culture.6  This analysis will serve to test which of the bivariate relationships hold up 
when other factors are considered simultaneously. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
Factors Predicting Lean Practices – Technical, Social and Enterprise 
OLS Regression Analysis 
 
                                                 
6 OLS analysis is utilized since we are interested in predicting the degrees to which the various 
dimensions of lean are found – a continuous dependent variable.   
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 There are just two structural factors predicting lean manufacturing practices.  The first 
model suggests that the technical aspects of lean are more likely in larger facilities (based on the 
number of employees), which is consistent with expectations.  Note, however, that this factor is 
no longer significant when we add the two process variables – the intellectual capital scale and 
the learning culture scale, which probably reflects the fact that the scales on valuing intellectual 
capital and fostering a learning culture are more likely to be higher in larger facilities.  In both 
models, the technical aspects of lean are less likely where per capita investment is high, which is 
consistent with the analysis of means, but not consistent with initial expectations.  The negative 
relationship with per capita investment holds in the second model, when we add process 
variables – suggesting that further analysis is needed into this interrelationship.  The two process 
variables substantially increase the explanatory power of the model, each having a positive and 
significant impact.      
 The second pair of models, examining factors predicting the social dimensions of lean 
highlights facility age – with these practices being more likely in newer facilities.  This reflects 
the incorporation of these practices in the newer “green field” facilities, as well as the difficulty 
of transforming older “brown field” facilities along these lines.  Also, in the first model of just 
structural factors, there is some indication of a reduced likelihood of these social dimension in 
the avionics sector, though this finding does not hold when we add into the analysis the two 
process scales for intellectual capital and learning culture.  Interestingly, the per capita 
investment variable has a positive and significant relationship here.  This is the opposite of what 
we saw in the technical dimensions of lean manufacturing and clearly calls for additional 
analysis.  Finally, there is a strong, positive impact of the two process variables, which is as 
would be expected on the social dimensions of lean. 
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 The final pair of models concerns the full range of lean enterprise practices.  Here we 
again find that these practices are more likely in newer facilities.  Also, the first model points to 
smaller facilities and the second model points to high-volume facilities as locations more likely 
to feature lean enterprise practices.  Most importantly, we again see the positive, significant 
impact of the two process scales.  
 The dominant finding from this analysis is that lean practices are most likely to be found 
in facilities placing a high value on many dimensions of intellectual capital and in facilities 
featuring a positive, learning culture.  This includes not just the social aspects of lean, but also 
the technical and enterprise dimensions.  The normative implication of this finding would be for 
organizations seeking to implement lean practices and principles to also ensure that a high value 
is placed on intellectual capital and learning culture.   
 
Assessing the Impact of Lean Practices and Other Factors on Social Outcomes 
 Despite the public debates over the impact of lean practices on social outcomes, virtually 
all research on this topic in the aerospace industry has been based on case studies (LARA, 2000-
2002; Murman, et. al., 2002).  These case studies clearly suggest that the social dimensions of 
lean are highly interdependent with the technical dimensions, but they still leave unresolved 
many important questions – particularly around the specific impact of lean practices on social 
outcomes such as employment and worker satisfaction.  As was the case with the first set of 
models, we begin with first-order effects through the comparison of means and then turn to the 
multivariate analysis. 
 Table 4 presents the outcomes for all three lean scales for these two outcomes.  With 
respect to both outcomes, the proponents of lean would predict a positive relationship, while 
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some of the detractors might expect a negative relationship.  In fact, the outcomes for worker 
satisfaction are positive and significant – with increased satisfaction associated with greater 
utilization of lean practices and principles.  Note, however, that the satisfaction levels are 
relatively low even in the most favorable category. 
 There is a much more ambiguous picture around employment growth.  Overall, the mean 
responses are between “no change” and “decreasing employment” – with a tendency toward a 
greater decline in employment in the case of the Lean Manufacturing/Technical Scale and even 
to some degree for the Lean Enterprise Scale.  This contrasts with the responses when arrayed 
across the Lean Social Systems Scale, which has a reverse relationship.  This is a key finding – 
confirming the critiques of the narrow, technical focus on lean manufacturing tools and 
highlighting the importance of the Lean Social Systems in attending to this key outcome for the 
workforce.  It will be essential to see if this relationship holds up in the multivariate analysis. 
Table 4 
Means for Social Outcomes and Lean Practices – Technical, Social and Enterprise 
2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 
 In order to contribute to further understanding along these lines, three models have been 
included in Table 5.  The first two focus on the impact of lean practices on employment, while 
the third examines the impact on the respondent’s perception of worker satisfaction in the 
facility.  It is important to note that the respondents are all senior facility managers.   Thus, if 
there is a bias to the responses, it is likely to be a bias reflecting a managerial perspective.  All 
three models have been run first with the scales for the social and technical dimensions of lean 
and then a second time with these two dimensions excluded and the lean enterprise scale 
included.  This approach allows for an analysis of the separate impacts of the social and technical 
dimensions, as well as the combined impact of both (along with other lean enterprise practices).  
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Also, a logistics regression model is used here since we are interested in predicting the likelihood 
of the outcomes increasing versus no change and decreasing – which is best done with a bivariate 
dependent variable in which the item have been re-coded as “1” for “increasing” (a 4 or 5 on a 
five point scale) versus a “0” for all other values (a 1, 2, or 3 on the five point scale). 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Factors Increasing the Likelihood of Social Performance Outcomes 
Logit Regression Analysis 
 
 The first model assesses the impact of structural and process factors on employment 
growth (versus no change or declining employment).  We see that employment growth is more 
likely in low volume operations and in larger facilities.  Interestingly, employment growth is less 
likely in unionized operations, which is consistent with other research documenting systematic 
corporate strategies aimed at expanding nonunion operations, rather than unionized operations 
(Verma, 19??).  This is also consistent with a common critique of union work rules as 
constraining employment growth.  Note too that this finding is in a regression model holding 
constant for various lean practices (including flexible work practices), which may indicate that 
there is less likelihood of employment growth in unionized operations where there are not these 
lean practices in place.7   
 The most striking finding in this model, however, concerns the social and technical 
dimensions of lean.  The technical lean manufacturing scale has a negative and significant 
impact on employment growth, while the scale comprised of the social aspects of lean has a 
positive and significant impact.  This provides confirmation of the fears expressed by employees 
                                                 
7 Note that this model has been run without the process factors and the strength of the union 
impact is reduced, though still signed negative and significant. 
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and their union representatives around a narrow, technical approach to lean having a negative 
impact on employment.  The concern is that the lean focus on eliminating waste – without strong 
attention to the social dimensions – will end up as a cost-cutting initiative rather than a vehicle 
for growing the operation.  The positive impact of the social dimension provides confirmation of 
the alternative argument, which is that a focus on employee knowledge, skills and a continuous 
improvement approach will help to increase employment.  When both of these factors are 
combined together, along with other enterprise dimensions there is no significant impact either 
way, which suggests that the overall impact of a lean enterprise initiative will be neutral with 
respect to employment.  While further research is needed to see if this find hold up in other 
analysis, these represent what may be the most important findings presented in this paper.   
 Given the important findings about employment growth, a second model has also been 
included in Table 5, which assessed a decline in employment (versus no change or growth).  This 
will serve to assess whether the impact of these factors is just with respect to growth or whether 
it involves a decline in jobs.  Here we see that a decline in employment is less likely in the space 
sector and the union impact holds here as in the first model.  Most importantly, the reverse 
impacts of the social and technical dimensions holds here.   On their own, the 
manufacturing/technical lean production practices increase the likelihood employment loss and 
the social systems aspects of lean reduce the likelihood of employment loss.  Again, the overall 
set of lean enterprise practices are neutral with respect to employment loss. 
 One final social outcome is assessed here, which is worker satisfaction.  Satisfaction is 
reported to be increasing in the aircraft and space sectors, which is not what would be expected 
given the layoffs and restructuring that has taken place in both sectors.  In the fist model, 
satisfaction is also higher in larger facilities – a finding for which we would not have a prior 
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prediction – and in facilities with higher per capita investment, which is as would be expected.  
Most importantly, the opposite relationship between the social and technical dimensions of lean 
holds here as well – facilities higher on the technical aspects of lean (and holding constant for the 
social aspects) are less likely to have increased worker satisfaction.  At the same time, facilities 
higher on the social dimensions of lean are more likely to have increasing worker satisfaction.  
This is a relationship not visible through the simple bivariate comparison of means and that 
further reinforces the important interdependences between the social and technical dimensions of 
lean systems. 
 In additional to the three lean scales (social, technical and enterprise), facilities high on 
the learning culture scale are also more likely to have increasing worker satisfaction.  While this 
factor did not show up as having a significant impact on employment growth or decline, it is both 
a key factor in explaining the presence of lean practices and in having an additional, separate 
impact on worker satisfaction. 
 
Assessing the Impact of Lean Practices and Other Factors on Economic Outcomes 
 Although there is a well-established literature assessing the performance implications of 
various clusters of work practices (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991; MacDuffie, 1995, Huselid, 1995; 
Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997; Applebaum, et. al., 2000), 
there has been relatively little analysis of the economic performance implications of the full set 
of lean practices (including lean enterprise practices).   Table 6 presents the means for measures 
of productivity, quality, and profitability.  These are all single item questions in which 
respondents were asked to assess whether performance had been increasing, not changing or 
decreasing over the past three years.  A five point scale was used in the question.  All three 
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variables indicate a positive and significant impact for the various dimensions of lean, though the 
magnitude of the impact is least with respect to profitability. 
Table 6 
Means for Economic Outcomes by Lean Practices – Technical, Social and Enterprise 
2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 
 
Changes in 
Productivity 
(1-5 Scale) 
Changes in 
Quality of 
Product or 
Service 
(1-5 scale) 
Changes in 
Profitability  
(1-5 scale) 
Low on Lean Enterprise Scale 2.6 3.0 2.6 
Medium on Lean Enterprise Scale 3.8 3.7 3.3 
High on Lean Enteprise Scale 4.1 4.0 3.8 
 
 A multivariate assessment of these outcomes is presented in Table 7.  The same lean 
models utilized in the analysis of social outcomes are used here, with two models for each of the 
three outcomes.  As the first two models suggest, there is a clear relationship between aspects of 
lean and productivity.  In particular, there is an independent positive impact of the social aspects 
of lean and a positive impact of the overall lean enterprise scale.  Note as well that the technical 
aspects of lean have a positive sign – in contrast to the findings on the social outcomes.  Also, 
these findings suggest that productivity gains are more likely in larger facilities. 
Table 7 
Factors Increasing the Likelihood of Increasing Economic Performance 
Logit Regression Analysis 
 
 Interestingly, none of the lean factors are significant in explaining increases in quality 
performance, but the learning culture scale does of a significant and positive impact.  This is 
consistent with the view that quality performance depends on an environment where learning 
new skills and approaches is valued.   
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 Finally, none of the process factors has an impact on increasing profitability.  The only 
factors at play here are size – larger facilities are more likely to report increasing profitability – 
and per-capita capital investment, which increases at the expense of profitability.  Neither 
finding is surprising.  The first suggests that there are economies of scale when it comes to 
profitability, while the second suggests that investment dollars come at the expense of 
profitability (at least in the short term).  More importantly, lean practices and the other process 
scales are not tightly linked to profitability, which suggests a tension around the relative 
emphasis given to these practices in a weak investment climate. 
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis in this paper has reviewed the causes and consequences of lean practices and 
principles for the U.S. aerospace industry.  These concepts have been identified as essential to 
the future of the industry, but as challenging to implement (Murman, 2002).  A picture emerges 
of partial transformation – with key insights into the social, technical and enterprise dimensions 
of the transformation.   
 Many structural factors provide relatively little predictive power in explaining the 
presence of lean practices and principles.  This includes variation by sector of the industry, 
supplier status, union status, and even production volume.  There is some predictive power based 
on facility size and age, though the strongest determinants of lean practices are not structural 
factors.  Instead, it is two other process factors – the learning climate and the relative value 
placed on various aspects of intellectual capital – that best help to predict the incidence of lean 
practices.  While the causality on these dimensions may run both ways, what is important is the 
finding of strong interrelationships.  Too many lean implementation initiatives involve relatively 
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fast implementation of technical and physical aspects of lean, such as new material handling 
systems and what are termed quality “andon” systems aimed at improving flow, reducing cycle 
time, and supporting in-station quality control.  The implementation of the social and more 
intangible aspects of lean, such as teams or continuous improvement principles, is more difficult.  
The findings here clearly suggest that the technical aspects of lean and the combined social and 
technical dimensions (at the enterprise level) depend on process capability around learning and 
the valuing of intellectual capital. 
 The opposite impacts of the technical and social dimensions of lean on employment 
outcomes represents perhaps the most telling finding from this research.  Narrowly focused lean 
initiatives – centered primarily on the technical and physical aspects of lean – have been 
criticized as likely to deteriorate into short term, “headcount” reduction cost-cutting initiatives.  
These finding provide support for this criticism.  At the same time, the research provides 
validation for more broadly focused lean initiatives that emphasize the social as well as the 
technical dimensions, and that take into account enterprise relationships.  The fact that all aspects 
of lean have a positive relationship to various performance outcomes makes the findings on the 
social outcomes even more important.  It suggests that there is a need for strong advocacy on the 
social and enterprise dimensions, since other economic outcomes might be achieved in the short 
run just with attention to the technical, manufacturing oriented aspects of lean. 
 The aerospace industry continues to be a dynamic context for organizational and systems 
transformation.  This research suggests that it will be process rather than structural factors that 
will drive this transformation.  Moreover, the transformation of the industry in ways that attend 
to the interests of many key stakeholders depends on establishing an interdependent mix of 
social, technical and enterprise process capabilities. 
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Table 1 
Organizational Change Initiatives in the U.S. Aerospace Industry 
1999 and 2002 National Aerospace Facility Surveys 
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Table 3 
Factors Predicting Lean Practices – Technical, Social and Enterprise 
OLS Regression Analysis – 2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Lean Production -- 
Technical Systems 
Lean Social Systems Lean Enterprise 
Scale 
 Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
      
Sector:  Aircraft frame & mech systems -.126 
.159 
-4.132E-02
( .143) 
-.176 
.160 
-1.121E-02 
(.114) 
-3.923E-02
.145 
8.853E-02
(.111) 
Sector:  Aircraft propulsion/engine 1.405E-03
.196 
7.202E-03
(.176) 
.142 
.198 
.131 
(.140) 
.166 
.179 
.163 
(.136) 
Sector:  Space, launch and missiles -.126 
.253 
-4.769E-02
(.228) 
-.132 
.255 
6.199E-02 
(.182) 
-9.624E-02
.231 
4.248E-02
(.176) 
Sector:  Avionics and electronic systems -7.346E-02
.170 
-1.051E-02
(.153) 
-.306 
.171 * 
-.168 
(.122) 
-.125 
.155 
-2.223E-02
(.118) 
Second, Third and Lower Tier Sub-
Contractor (1=yes; 2=no) 
9.196E-02
.131 
.207 
(.119) 
-1.090E-02
.132 
.129 
(.095) 
8.354E-03
.120 
.140 
(.092) * 
Product Volume -- Primary Product (1=low 
vol; 2=med vol; 3=high vol) 
.119 
.099 
.148 
(.089) * 
4.193E-02
.100 
6.306E-02 
(.071) 
6.459E-02
.090 
9.094E-02
(.069) 
Facility Age (in Years) -4.279E-03
.003 
-1.992E-03
(.003) 
-1.033E-02
.004 ** 
-6.376E-03 
(.003) ** 
-7.724E-03
.003 * 
-4.524E-03
(.002) * 
Log of employment .198 
098 * 
8.414E-02
(.090) 
9.314E-02
.098 
-3.735E-02 
(.072) 
.201 
.089 * 
7.482E-02
(.070) 
Approximate dollars of per capita investment 
in new technology (in thousands) 
-4.530E-03
002 * 
-3.183E-03
(.002) * 
7.554E-04
.002 
2.343E-03 
(.002) * 
-1.136E-03
.002 
3.837E-04
(.002) 
Unions Present (1=yes; 0=no) -1.890E-02
.173 
-7.517E-02
(.155) 
9.326E-02
.174 
4.445E-02 
(.124) 
.159 
.157 
.104 
(.120) 
 
PROCESS VARIABLES 
      
Learning Climate Scale (six item scale; 
Alpha=.86) 
-- .192 
(.063) ** 
-- .451 
(.050) *** 
-- .328 
(.049) *** 
Intellectual Capital Scale (thirteen item 
scale; Alpha=.85) 
-- .397 
(.100) *** 
-- .361 
(.079) *** 
 
-- .395 
(.077) *** 
       
Constant 3.592 
.339 *** 
1.320 
(.448) ** 
3.924 
.341 *** 
.419 
(.357) 
3.494 
.308 *** 
.521 
(.346) * 
   
Adj. R2 .07 .22 .01 .51 .02 .44
 
*   Significant at the .1 level; **  Significant at the .01 level; *** Significant at the .001 level 
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Table 4 
Means for Social Outcomes and Lean Practices – Technical, Social and Enterprise 
2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
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Table 5 
Factors Increasing the Likelihood of Social Performance Outcomes 
Logit Regression Analysis – 2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 Employment 
Increasing 
Employment 
Declining 
Worker 
Satisfaction 
Increasing 
 Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
      
Sector:  Aircraft frame & mech systems 
 
.031 
.418 
.207 
.450 
-.042 
.351 
-.019 
.389 
.292 
.380 
.665 
.424 * 
Sector:  Aircraft propulsion/engine 
 
.170 
.490 
.312 
.547 
-.271 
.418 
-.269 
.479 
-.330 
.472 
-.024 
.536 
Sector:  Space, launch and missiles 
 
.421 
.619 
.349 
.703 
-1.002 
.556 * 
-1.048 
.657 * 
1.005 
.595 * 
1.055 
.673 * 
Sector:  Avionics and electronic systems 
 
.412 
.476 
.294 
.493 
-.305 
.403 
-.041 
.426 
.528 
.439 
.674 
.470 
Second, Third and Lower Tier Sub-
Contractor (1=yes; 2=no) 
.077 
.348 
-.104 
.378 
-.122 
.296 
-.081 
.328 
.213 
.323 
.438 
.353 
Product Volume -- Primary Product (1=low 
vol; 2=med vol; 3=high vol) 
-.403 
.247 * 
-.465 
.272 * 
.110 
.217 
.147 
.247 
-.128 
.240 
-.121 
.272 
Facility Age (in Years) 
 
.001 
.009 
-.002 
.010 
-.002 
.008 
-.001 
.009 
-.004 
.009 
-.003 
.009 
Log of employment 
 
.752 
.286 ** 
.500 
.292 * 
.114 
.239 
.158 
.254 
.388 
.262 * 
-.002 
.274 
Approximate dollars of per capita investment 
in new technology (in thousands) 
.003 
.005 
.010 
.006 
.003 
.004 
-.005 
.006 
.007 
.004 * 
.009 
.006 
Unions Present (1=yes; 0=no) 
 
-1.344 
.549 ** 
-1.140 
.553 * 
.614 
.425 * 
.582 
.447 
-.251 
.446 
.291 
.466 
 
PROCESS VARIABLES 
      
Learning Climate Scale (six item scale; 
Alpha=.86) 
-.272 
.232 
-.187 
.230 
-.091 
.251 
-.120 
.291 
.490 
.228 * 
.849 
.249 *** 
Intellectual Capital Scale (thirteen item 
scale; Alpha=.85) 
.213 
.305 
.412 
.344 
.048 
.192 
.024 
.195 
-.024 
.279 
-.067 
.319 
Lean Production – Technical Systems 
(four Item scale; Alpha=.60) 
-.534 
.253 * 
-- .595 
.219 ** 
-- -.624 
.241 ** 
-- 
Lean Social Systems (six Item scale; 
Alpha=.80) 
.734 
.318 * 
-- -.408 
.264 * 
-- 1.126 
.307 *** 
-- 
Lean Enterprise Scale (fifteen item 
scale: Alpha=.88) 
-- .094 
.300 
-- .166 
.262 
--  .313 
.289 
    
Constant -1.818 
1.310 
-1.825 
1.388 
-.879 
1.120 
-.638 
1.220 
-5.477 
1.349 *** 
-6.145 
1.498 *** 
Cox & Snell R2 .081 .068 .059 .038 .192 .170
Nagelkerke R2 .122 .099 .079 .051 .259 .229
 
*   Significant at the .1 level; **  Significant at the .01 level; *** Significant at the .001 level 
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Table 7 
Factors Increasing the Likelihood of Increasing Economic Performance 
Logit Regression Analysis – 2002 National Aerospace Facility Survey 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 Productivity 
Performance 
Increasing 
Quality 
Performance 
Increasing 
Profitability 
Performance 
Increasing 
 Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
Beta 
(SE) 
 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
      
Sector:  Aircraft frame & mech systems 
 
-.113 
.436 
-.030 
.523 
-.054 
.375 
.153 
.433 
.297 
.362 
.046 
.418 
Sector:  Aircraft propulsion/engine 
 
-.204 
.519 
-.029 
.675 
.101 
.476 
.233 
.568 
-1.188 
.452 ** 
-1.313 
.521 ** 
Sector:  Space, launch and missiles 
 
.349 
.747 
-.229 
.832 
.581 
.644 
.315 
.705 
-.133 
.568 
-.710 
.671 
Sector:  Avionics and electronic systems -.665 
.464 
-.549 
.515 
 
-.382 
.427 
-.333 
.463 
-.290 
.410 
-.423 
.446 
Second, Third and Lower Tier Sub-
Contractor (1=yes; 2=no) 
-.026 
.362 
-.006 
.430 
.311 
.324 
.297 
.367 
.216 
.306 
.310 
.349 
Product Volume -- Primary Product (1=low 
vol; 2=med vol; 3=high vol) 
.329 
.261 
.326 
.318 
.256 
.234 
.229 
.275 
.040 
.222 
.061 
.257 
Facility Age (in Years) 
 
-.007 
.010 
.011 
.012 
.004 
.009 
.009 
.010 
-.004 
.008 
-.002 
.009 
Log of employment 
 
1.333 
.323 *** 
.893 
.356 ** 
-.022 
.259 
-.395 
.288 
.898 
.256 ** 
.776 
.278 ** 
Approximate dollars of per capita investment 
in new technology (in thousands) 
.003 
.004 
.000 
.006 
.002 
.005 
.001 
.006 
-.004 
.005 
-.017 
.009 * 
Unions Present (1=yes; 0=no) 
 
-.346 
.503 
-.496 
.578 
-.109 
.432 
.266 
.485 
-.567 
.415 
-.413 
.459 
 
PROCESS VARIABLES 
      
Learning Climate Scale (six item scale; 
Alpha=.86) 
-.067 
.225 
.126 
.238 
.481 
.207 * 
.597 
.224 ** 
.247 
.202 
.275 
.215 
Intellectual Capital Scale (thirteen item 
scale; Alpha=.85) 
.029 
.292 
-.111 
.362 
.246 
.273 
.372 
.328 
.127 
.261 
.305 
.317 
Lean Production – Technical Systems 
(four Item scale; Alpha=.60) 
.118 
.251 
-- .151 
.229 
-- -.238 
.220 
-- 
Lean Social Systems (six Item scale; 
Alpha=.80) 
.658 
.306 * 
-- .211 
.274 
-- .247 
.266 
-- 
Lean Enterprise Scale (fifteen item 
scale: Alpha=.88) 
-- 1.047 
.342 ** 
-- .189 
.300 
-- .010 
.277 
    
Constant -4.651 
1.403 *** 
-5.576 
1.660 *** 
-4.745 
1.265 *** 
-4.413 
1.410 ** 
-3.158 
1.205 ** 
-3.500 
1.341 ** 
Cox & Snell R2 .148 .167 .122 .131 .128 .149
Nagelkerke R2 .219 .255 .169 .182 .170 .199
 
*   Significant at the .1 level; **  Significant at the .01 level; *** Significant at the .001 level 
 
